I caught this article - http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/nov/17/heart-disease-ancient-egyptians - in today’s Guardian. To summarise, based on body scans of twenty mummified corpses, approximately 3,500 years old. Of these, sixteen had identifiable circulatory systems (hearts and arteries), and nine showed signs of atherosclerosis (that is to say arteries whose walls have been damaged and whose lumina have been occluded by fatty deposition). From this, the article states that the researchers involved appear have concluded that a great number Egyptians of high socioeconomic status tended to suffer from cardiovascular disease.
All well and good, although nine of twenty mummies is hardly good enough to draw any real conclusions, and a claim made by one of the research team that "The findings suggest that we may have to look beyond modern risk factors to fully understand the disease [atherosclerosis]" seems an incredible overstatement. It seems hardly surprising that wealthy Egyptians would have been able to eat a diet heavy in meat, and indeed needing to do no physical labour themselves, could well have grown fat and developed heart and arterial disease. I hardly think that were we to have a perfectly preserved Henry VIII to dissect and examine, we would conclude from his morbidly obese, gouty body that all Tudors had heart disease and that it can't just be modern diets that are problematic. The man was a glutton par excellence, as, I imagine, were many rich Egyptians.
The above is largely apropos of nothing, but it did point me to two other recent stories relating to pharaonic Egypt. Firstly, the revelation that new evidence suggests the pyramids were not built by slaves, which I was not too surprised to hear. Secondly, more interestingly, was the call by Dr. Zawi Hawass, the head of the Egyptian Supreme Court of Antiquities, for the return of the Rosetta Stone to Egypt from the British Museum.
The two stories together got me thinking - Egypt retains a place in the popular imagination, but generally people only really know of names like Tutankhamun, and stories pertaining to him, such as the fabled curse of his tomb that befell the team that discovered his tomb led by Howard Carter. Overall the ancient age is rather poorly represented in our national psyche. Frankly, Tutankhamun is a boring subject, and was an irrelevant king, and it is a great shame that he is perhaps first to jump to our minds when we think of Egypt. We know his name because of gold, and gold alone. So, since the Rosetta Stone is in the news, I thought I'd tell you a little tale about it...
The stone was discovered in the late 1790s, by the French under Napoleon. The arrival of British forces in Egpyt who defeated the French at Cairo explains how it made its way to its current home in London. These are reasonably trivial details - the really interesting part is the information inscribed.
The stone features inscriptions in three languages - classical Greek, and two Egyptian scripts, hieroglyphics and demotic (naturally, the Egpytians didn't just write in the intricate hieroglyphics - there were two less formal written languages of hieratic and demotic to use). The stone was thus immensely valuable, providing the key to reading the hieroglyphs present throughout the tombs and temples of the land.
The first man to really get to grips with the stone was the Englishman Thomas Young, but before he really got into his stride, he grew bored of the stone and abandoned his search. It was ultimately a Frenchman, Jean-Francois Champollion, who would prove a key. He correctly identified that the glyphs were based on phonetic sounds (i.e. if I were to represent the word 'belief' as an English hieroglyph, I would draw a bee, then a leaf), and that the sounds came from the spoken Coptic language of the Egyptians. With his consumate knowledge of Coptic, Champollion correctly translated the cartouche (the names of Egyptian kings were surrounded in an oval or cartouche in hieroglyphics) of the pharaoh Ramesses.
Upon discovering this, he shouted 'Je tiens l'affaire!' (Eureka!) and collapsed, not waking for five days. Fortunately, living with his brother who had supported him, he regained consciousness and made his discovery known, achieving a lifelong dream.
I don't know if that story made any impression - indeed, you may already have known of it, or heard it. I thought of other episodes in the history of Egypt but somehow this story is the one I feel ought to be most well known (though, if you have time, I'd look into the stories of Hatshepsut and Ahkenaten, fascinating pharaohs who did frankly staggering things) - and indeed, to turn a little Aesopian, there is a slight moral to this diatribe. It's easy to be bewitched by tales of rich boy kings (like Tutankhamun). I'd like to think that maybe, with Egypt, people would look a little deeper if they knew a little more. I've barely scratched the surface of the rich collection of personalities and tales from the pharaonic times. So, if this piqued your interest, try and quell your inner magpie, and remember, all that glisters is not gold...
Monday, January 18, 2010
Sunday, January 17, 2010
Thoughts on how UK companies are run (I promise to write something more fun next time)
Corporate governance is the system by which a company is regulated and controlled, and gives ‘an architecture of accountability – the structures and processes to ensure companies are managed in the interests of their owners’. Within the UK, such structures are principally based upon the notion of shareholder primacy, which is to say that the companies overarching aim is to provide profit to those who own the company. Under the Companies Act 2006, s33 provides that there is a contractual relationship between shareholders and the company, and between shareholders themselves. As a result, the key basis for how a company’s affairs are handled under UK law lies in the fact that shareholders effectively own the company, but that they delegate responsibility for management to the directors. This separation of ownership and control means that effectively the board of directors are responsible for the entrepreneurial enterprise of the company, but must also ensure that checks and balances exist to minimise risks. From a corporate governance standpoint, it is the interaction between the board and shareholders which is pivotal. For companies to be governed effectively, it is paramount that boards provide accurate, detailed information and act with a good degree of transparency, so that shareholders, in their turn, can make an accurate appraisal of the company’s affairs and contribute to the decision making processes of the company.
The other vital provisions relating to UK corporate governance come in the form of ‘The Combined Code on Corporate Governance’, most recently updated in 2003. It is important to note that the provisions of the code do not have the force of legislation, and that a company is free to deviate from the code provided an explanation as to why this has occurred is given (the ‘comply or explain’ principle6). As such it is clear that companies in the UK are fundamentally self-regulating, as they are not formally bound by any extrinsic rules. In this essay, I will be examining and assessing whether these key principles of self regulation and separation of ownership and control are responsible for the shortcomings of corporate governance in England and Wales, especially following the recent financial crisis.
The most fundamental issue as concerns the above approach involves risk. To paraphrase Adam Smith, as directors are in effect managing other people’s money (the shareholders), rather than their own, it is unlikely to expect that they will watch over it with the same degree of vigilance. Equally, whilst shareholders have a purely financial interest in the company, directors may wish to pursue divergent aims outside of solely looking to maximise profits. Due to the fact that shareholders may well lack the time and resources to stay fully informed of the company’s activities, and the obvious disparity in the level of information available between directors and shareholders where the separation of ownership and control exists, it would seem that the directors may be allowed to act in a relatively unchecked manner. It has been shown repeatedly, from the earliest corporate scandal of the South Sea Company, through to the present financial crisis, that such freedom is often abused. Furthermore, these issues concerning separation of ownership and control may well have impeded the British economy. The ACCA, in a recent report, identified poor corporate governance as one of the chief reasons underpinning the credit crunch, and noted the need for greater shareholder and wider stakeholder involvement in holding boards to account.
A recent LSE study notes that there is still a notable degree of failure by boards to explain non-compliances with codes. This highlights the fact that shareholders may often remain in the dark about corporate behaviours, another example of the potential issues with the current model of UK governance. It is clear, then, that the division of ownership and control as a model for corporate governance has significant shortcomings, in that boards typically possess too much control, and shareholders are unable to provide a satisfactory check upon them, through a combination of apathy or inability, and a lack of information coming from the directors. The recent OECD report on governance and the financial crisis states that shareholders have failed to hold boards to account and have made too little effort to engage and meet with directors, and cited low turnout of shareholders at key votes as a significant issue. This so-called principal-agency problem clearly pre-dates the current financial crisis, and is manifestly a key issue. A report from 2004 looking specifically into governance issues within the banking system, states that ‘A cursory review of recent banking crises would suggest that many causes for concern relate to management decisions which reflect agency problems involving management.
Management may have different risk preferences from those of other stakeholders including the government, owners, creditors, etc., or limited competence in assessing the risks involved in its decisions, and yet have significant freedom of action because of the absence of adequate control systems able to resolve agency problems…’, and that ‘The principal-agent problem, outlined above, poses a systemic threat to financial systems when the incentives of management for banking or securities firms are not aligned with those of the owners of the firm.’. Even the Institute of Directors, which feels that the current UK model of corporate governance is ‘fundamentally sound’, is in accord on these issues. In its response to the Walker report on corporate governance, the IoD voiced its opinion that ‘The financial crisis has highlighted the fact that shareholders are not always sufficiently committed to the fulfilment of this role. Leading up to the crisis, they failed to ask the right questions and did not engage sufficiently with boards in respect of proposed business strategies and risk profiles. As Lord Myners has commented, many institutional shareholders continue to behave like “absentee landlords’.
In assessing the above, it seems clear to me that the separation of ownership and control provides significant issues for corporate governance within England and Wales. The inequality in information available to shareholders versus directors ensures that boards are not effectively monitored and kept in check, and abuses may well go undetected. The discrepancy between the aims and attitudes to risk between directors and wider stakeholders also means that corporations are often governed and run in a manner that is inconsistent with the desire of the owners of the company. It is apparent that there is a definitive need for closer relationships to exist between board members and shareholders.
The IoD’s suggestion of introducing a reciprocal combined code for investors, ensuring that there is a framework enforcing shareholder involvement, and requiring a ‘comply or explain’ approach where shareholders did not adhere. A greater drive and emphasis on boards to ensure that quality, independently verified information is obtained and disseminated to shareholders to ensure that they are able to make informed judgements as regards the company and the manner in which it is run. This is especially so in light of the decline of UK institutional investors, those bodies who are perhaps best placed and able to hold boards to account. Hopefully, the recent crisis will focus minds on these issues and improvements of governance will come to fruition, as it is clear that the status quo is at best unsatisfactory.
In addition to the separation of ownership and control, the issue of self-regulation must be considered. Whilst there is some statutory regulation in place affecting corporations (specifically the Companies Acts of 1985 and 2006) which set out directors’ duties, for example, the Combined Code provides a more significant framework setting out standards for good practice. It is important to note that adherence to this code is voluntary in the sense that there are no legal sanctions for non-adherence. Compliance is sought through the ‘comply or explain’ approach, which following a report conducted by the LSE seems to be working well, and indeed improving year on year. It seems that in spite of the recent financial crisis, the Combined Code has retained strong support according to the Financial Reporting Council’s recent review and consultation thereon. It was noted in that review that the current ‘soft law’ approach is preferable to a more heavily legislative environment, in that it provides a greater deal of flexibility and the ability to adapt more rapidly to changes in the corporate climate. This echoes the view that the FRC put forward in 2003, where it accorded with Sir Derek Higgs’ view that legislation was not the way forward due to its general inflexibility, and the fact that it is best that the shareholders and directors come together to in order to consider what is in the company’s best interest, and cited the Cadbury Committee’s statement that ‘statutory measures would impose a minimum standard and there would be a greater risk of boards complying with the letter, rather than with the sprit, of the requirements’.
The IoD is particularly vociferous in its anti-regulatory stance, noting those issues stated above, but also stating that the UK benefits from the lack of regulation, citing the comparative impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, which imposes onerous regulatory requirements, and has cost corporations a cumulative estimated total of $1.4 trillion, as well as driving companies away from registering in New York towards other financial centres. If we consider that much of the current global financial difficulties can trace their origins to the USA, this hardly suggests that firmer legislative regulation can really have a significant part to play, and certainly indicates that the UK’s current approach may well be preferable to a more regulatory climate.
It is perhaps understandable given recent events within the global economy to state that greater regulation is necessary to ensure that such events are not repeated and to be able to hold individuals responsible to account for negligent corporate practices. However, in assessing the above I am wholly unconvinced of the need for any introduction of legislation. Codes are advantageous in providing standards. Legislation may well be complied with to the letter, but as has been seen in the USA, such is no guarantee of good corporate governance, and may well carry more negative facets than positives, especially if wealth stimulation and creation is stifled.
However, the ‘soft law’ approach is of course not perfect. Compliance is voluntary and no sanction may be brought for non-compliance with the code. As such, boards must be relied on to engage with and adopt any code, something which naturally may be difficult to achieve. There may equally be some areas where corporate behaviour must be curtailed by legislation. I find it hard to imagine there is great desire amongst UK banks to adopt a model where commercial and investment banking are separated, but I would accord with Lord Lawson’s view that such a model (in line with the now repealed US Glass-Steagall Act) is highly desirable and definitively in the public interest. Increased regulation in other areas, especially re the environment, may also be necessary to ensure that companies adhere to principles of corporate social responsibility. Manifestly, compliance with codes on governance depends on corporate willingness to adhere. Such willingness may fluctuate, and presents the key weakness in such an approach
The other vital provisions relating to UK corporate governance come in the form of ‘The Combined Code on Corporate Governance’, most recently updated in 2003. It is important to note that the provisions of the code do not have the force of legislation, and that a company is free to deviate from the code provided an explanation as to why this has occurred is given (the ‘comply or explain’ principle6). As such it is clear that companies in the UK are fundamentally self-regulating, as they are not formally bound by any extrinsic rules. In this essay, I will be examining and assessing whether these key principles of self regulation and separation of ownership and control are responsible for the shortcomings of corporate governance in England and Wales, especially following the recent financial crisis.
The most fundamental issue as concerns the above approach involves risk. To paraphrase Adam Smith, as directors are in effect managing other people’s money (the shareholders), rather than their own, it is unlikely to expect that they will watch over it with the same degree of vigilance. Equally, whilst shareholders have a purely financial interest in the company, directors may wish to pursue divergent aims outside of solely looking to maximise profits. Due to the fact that shareholders may well lack the time and resources to stay fully informed of the company’s activities, and the obvious disparity in the level of information available between directors and shareholders where the separation of ownership and control exists, it would seem that the directors may be allowed to act in a relatively unchecked manner. It has been shown repeatedly, from the earliest corporate scandal of the South Sea Company, through to the present financial crisis, that such freedom is often abused. Furthermore, these issues concerning separation of ownership and control may well have impeded the British economy. The ACCA, in a recent report, identified poor corporate governance as one of the chief reasons underpinning the credit crunch, and noted the need for greater shareholder and wider stakeholder involvement in holding boards to account.
A recent LSE study notes that there is still a notable degree of failure by boards to explain non-compliances with codes. This highlights the fact that shareholders may often remain in the dark about corporate behaviours, another example of the potential issues with the current model of UK governance. It is clear, then, that the division of ownership and control as a model for corporate governance has significant shortcomings, in that boards typically possess too much control, and shareholders are unable to provide a satisfactory check upon them, through a combination of apathy or inability, and a lack of information coming from the directors. The recent OECD report on governance and the financial crisis states that shareholders have failed to hold boards to account and have made too little effort to engage and meet with directors, and cited low turnout of shareholders at key votes as a significant issue. This so-called principal-agency problem clearly pre-dates the current financial crisis, and is manifestly a key issue. A report from 2004 looking specifically into governance issues within the banking system, states that ‘A cursory review of recent banking crises would suggest that many causes for concern relate to management decisions which reflect agency problems involving management.
Management may have different risk preferences from those of other stakeholders including the government, owners, creditors, etc., or limited competence in assessing the risks involved in its decisions, and yet have significant freedom of action because of the absence of adequate control systems able to resolve agency problems…’, and that ‘The principal-agent problem, outlined above, poses a systemic threat to financial systems when the incentives of management for banking or securities firms are not aligned with those of the owners of the firm.’. Even the Institute of Directors, which feels that the current UK model of corporate governance is ‘fundamentally sound’, is in accord on these issues. In its response to the Walker report on corporate governance, the IoD voiced its opinion that ‘The financial crisis has highlighted the fact that shareholders are not always sufficiently committed to the fulfilment of this role. Leading up to the crisis, they failed to ask the right questions and did not engage sufficiently with boards in respect of proposed business strategies and risk profiles. As Lord Myners has commented, many institutional shareholders continue to behave like “absentee landlords’.
In assessing the above, it seems clear to me that the separation of ownership and control provides significant issues for corporate governance within England and Wales. The inequality in information available to shareholders versus directors ensures that boards are not effectively monitored and kept in check, and abuses may well go undetected. The discrepancy between the aims and attitudes to risk between directors and wider stakeholders also means that corporations are often governed and run in a manner that is inconsistent with the desire of the owners of the company. It is apparent that there is a definitive need for closer relationships to exist between board members and shareholders.
The IoD’s suggestion of introducing a reciprocal combined code for investors, ensuring that there is a framework enforcing shareholder involvement, and requiring a ‘comply or explain’ approach where shareholders did not adhere. A greater drive and emphasis on boards to ensure that quality, independently verified information is obtained and disseminated to shareholders to ensure that they are able to make informed judgements as regards the company and the manner in which it is run. This is especially so in light of the decline of UK institutional investors, those bodies who are perhaps best placed and able to hold boards to account. Hopefully, the recent crisis will focus minds on these issues and improvements of governance will come to fruition, as it is clear that the status quo is at best unsatisfactory.
In addition to the separation of ownership and control, the issue of self-regulation must be considered. Whilst there is some statutory regulation in place affecting corporations (specifically the Companies Acts of 1985 and 2006) which set out directors’ duties, for example, the Combined Code provides a more significant framework setting out standards for good practice. It is important to note that adherence to this code is voluntary in the sense that there are no legal sanctions for non-adherence. Compliance is sought through the ‘comply or explain’ approach, which following a report conducted by the LSE seems to be working well, and indeed improving year on year. It seems that in spite of the recent financial crisis, the Combined Code has retained strong support according to the Financial Reporting Council’s recent review and consultation thereon. It was noted in that review that the current ‘soft law’ approach is preferable to a more heavily legislative environment, in that it provides a greater deal of flexibility and the ability to adapt more rapidly to changes in the corporate climate. This echoes the view that the FRC put forward in 2003, where it accorded with Sir Derek Higgs’ view that legislation was not the way forward due to its general inflexibility, and the fact that it is best that the shareholders and directors come together to in order to consider what is in the company’s best interest, and cited the Cadbury Committee’s statement that ‘statutory measures would impose a minimum standard and there would be a greater risk of boards complying with the letter, rather than with the sprit, of the requirements’.
The IoD is particularly vociferous in its anti-regulatory stance, noting those issues stated above, but also stating that the UK benefits from the lack of regulation, citing the comparative impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, which imposes onerous regulatory requirements, and has cost corporations a cumulative estimated total of $1.4 trillion, as well as driving companies away from registering in New York towards other financial centres. If we consider that much of the current global financial difficulties can trace their origins to the USA, this hardly suggests that firmer legislative regulation can really have a significant part to play, and certainly indicates that the UK’s current approach may well be preferable to a more regulatory climate.
It is perhaps understandable given recent events within the global economy to state that greater regulation is necessary to ensure that such events are not repeated and to be able to hold individuals responsible to account for negligent corporate practices. However, in assessing the above I am wholly unconvinced of the need for any introduction of legislation. Codes are advantageous in providing standards. Legislation may well be complied with to the letter, but as has been seen in the USA, such is no guarantee of good corporate governance, and may well carry more negative facets than positives, especially if wealth stimulation and creation is stifled.
However, the ‘soft law’ approach is of course not perfect. Compliance is voluntary and no sanction may be brought for non-compliance with the code. As such, boards must be relied on to engage with and adopt any code, something which naturally may be difficult to achieve. There may equally be some areas where corporate behaviour must be curtailed by legislation. I find it hard to imagine there is great desire amongst UK banks to adopt a model where commercial and investment banking are separated, but I would accord with Lord Lawson’s view that such a model (in line with the now repealed US Glass-Steagall Act) is highly desirable and definitively in the public interest. Increased regulation in other areas, especially re the environment, may also be necessary to ensure that companies adhere to principles of corporate social responsibility. Manifestly, compliance with codes on governance depends on corporate willingness to adhere. Such willingness may fluctuate, and presents the key weakness in such an approach
Sex, God and Excrement
Like many of the world's inhabitants, I stubbed my toe today. Whilst you may find this amusing (and hearing my Hugh Grant-esque shriek of 'bugger!' may well be somewhat funny), I, naturally, did not. Indeed, as I've already alluded to, my brain and tongue immediately lurched for a syllable or two of the Anglo-Saxon.
What struck me about that moment was that forcing out an expletive made me feel better, not merely because I love swearing (I bloody do). The pain in my toe ebbed, tangibly, and I wondered why. I imagine a sensible person would've cleaned up some of the blood first, but never mind.
It would appear that it is fairly settled science that swearing is useful as regards pain relief. An American study, published online on July 13th in NeuroReport (http://journals.lww.com/neuroreport/) found that if participants were to hold their hand in freezing water for as long as possible, they would cope better and endure longer if they swore (when compared to not swearing or saying a neutral word such as 'table). Interestingly, one participant, when asked to list five swear words they might exclaim after suffering pain, failed to come up with a single curse and was thus cut from the study.
However, it seems that this was the first and only study to look at the phenomenon, and it's worth noting that the sample size was small (67 participants), and that the neurology of pain is a complex matter (see here for example http://thalamus.wustl.edu/course/body.html). As such the findings may not be conclusive, but there is a satisfyingly inherent logic behind it all.
The proposed rationale behind the pain relief is that the act of swearing triggers a sort of internal feedback mechanism, triggering the sympathetic nervous system (the fight or flight mechanism, as it is more colloquillaly known). The key outcome is a surge in adrenaline throughout the body. Adrenaline acts within the nervous pathways, effectively helping to dampen down the pain signals which reach your brain from the periphery. It is a compelling argument as it is demonstrable that swearing has this effect (your heart jumps a little when you swear, a classic sign of increased adrenaline), and that adrenaline acts as an analgesic.
This may, in itself, provide some insight into the linguistic origins of swearing. I've always been interested in how we invoke God ('deistic' swearing) and bodily functions ('visceral' swearing) when we swear. English has a curious linguistic make-up, but it is unmistakenly the Germanic origins of our venacular that inspire our swearing. There are numerous examples of this, from German's 'Scheisse' and our 'shit', or the Afrikaner's 'Fokk/fokken' and our 'fuck' (it is worth pointing out that it is a fallacious folk etymology that suggests that fuck is an acronym of the pharse' Fornicated Under Charles the King). But why sex, and why God?
Based on what I've already written, the visceral element of swearing is more readily explainable. Words invoking sex are highly evocative, and inducing thoughts of such will obviously have a physiological effect. It seems possible that what really upsets us with swearing is not the sound of it on our ear, rather its physiological impact upon us. When someone incants a word pertaining to faeces, we feel a revulsion that goes beyond the sound and tone of the letters compiled together - it appeals to something more basic, an evolutionary part of us that acknowledges that excrement is brimming with potential disease. As such sex and excrement can be seen as positive and negative elements of the visceral swearing spectrum. It would of course be foolish and simplistic to ignore cultural and historical influences in swearing - the worst swear word by anyone's standards is undoubtedly the word 'cunt', a Victorian era word for a prostitute. Considering the sexual repression that marked that era in British history, it is no stretch to say that physiology alone cannot describe how that word came to be so reviled. It is worth noting that the -unt suffix is, dispassionately, more guttural and perfunctory sounding than -uck or -it, and so we cannot ignore the purely linguistic implications of spelling either!
Deistic swearing is a far more challenging topic. Any notion of God must, by my logic, become part of language later than any vocabularly to do with bodily functions (it seems odd to suppose a child, for example, would discuss Hume with you before it told you thatit needed to go to the toilet). I have no doubt that the word God and notions thereof can inspire physical feelings within people that are of a potency. But I doubt that the visceral swearing explanation fits our purpose. It seems to me that a cultural explanation is more likely. Early societies which grappled with God were invariably polytheistic, prone to Shamanism. I would surmise that it is this that provides our first insight into how we came to 'blaspheme' on stubbing our toes. There were undoubtedly certain words that simply could not be uttered within these cultures save by those ordained by communities with the right to utter them. Words acquiring a taboo status undoubtedly develop a power and a mystique that others simply do not. It may well be that the fear involved in speaking such words may lead to a 'visceral swearing' type response, but this seemingly must have followed from the cultural constraints applied.
Obviously, this is a fairly redcutionist view, and it is likely that there are a plethora of other factors I've neglected. It is at least pleasing to note, however, that even stubbing one's toe can be interesting - and if you disgaree? Well, fuck off :)
What struck me about that moment was that forcing out an expletive made me feel better, not merely because I love swearing (I bloody do). The pain in my toe ebbed, tangibly, and I wondered why. I imagine a sensible person would've cleaned up some of the blood first, but never mind.
It would appear that it is fairly settled science that swearing is useful as regards pain relief. An American study, published online on July 13th in NeuroReport (http://journals.lww.com/neuroreport/) found that if participants were to hold their hand in freezing water for as long as possible, they would cope better and endure longer if they swore (when compared to not swearing or saying a neutral word such as 'table). Interestingly, one participant, when asked to list five swear words they might exclaim after suffering pain, failed to come up with a single curse and was thus cut from the study.
However, it seems that this was the first and only study to look at the phenomenon, and it's worth noting that the sample size was small (67 participants), and that the neurology of pain is a complex matter (see here for example http://thalamus.wustl.edu/course/body.html). As such the findings may not be conclusive, but there is a satisfyingly inherent logic behind it all.
The proposed rationale behind the pain relief is that the act of swearing triggers a sort of internal feedback mechanism, triggering the sympathetic nervous system (the fight or flight mechanism, as it is more colloquillaly known). The key outcome is a surge in adrenaline throughout the body. Adrenaline acts within the nervous pathways, effectively helping to dampen down the pain signals which reach your brain from the periphery. It is a compelling argument as it is demonstrable that swearing has this effect (your heart jumps a little when you swear, a classic sign of increased adrenaline), and that adrenaline acts as an analgesic.
This may, in itself, provide some insight into the linguistic origins of swearing. I've always been interested in how we invoke God ('deistic' swearing) and bodily functions ('visceral' swearing) when we swear. English has a curious linguistic make-up, but it is unmistakenly the Germanic origins of our venacular that inspire our swearing. There are numerous examples of this, from German's 'Scheisse' and our 'shit', or the Afrikaner's 'Fokk/fokken' and our 'fuck' (it is worth pointing out that it is a fallacious folk etymology that suggests that fuck is an acronym of the pharse' Fornicated Under Charles the King). But why sex, and why God?
Based on what I've already written, the visceral element of swearing is more readily explainable. Words invoking sex are highly evocative, and inducing thoughts of such will obviously have a physiological effect. It seems possible that what really upsets us with swearing is not the sound of it on our ear, rather its physiological impact upon us. When someone incants a word pertaining to faeces, we feel a revulsion that goes beyond the sound and tone of the letters compiled together - it appeals to something more basic, an evolutionary part of us that acknowledges that excrement is brimming with potential disease. As such sex and excrement can be seen as positive and negative elements of the visceral swearing spectrum. It would of course be foolish and simplistic to ignore cultural and historical influences in swearing - the worst swear word by anyone's standards is undoubtedly the word 'cunt', a Victorian era word for a prostitute. Considering the sexual repression that marked that era in British history, it is no stretch to say that physiology alone cannot describe how that word came to be so reviled. It is worth noting that the -unt suffix is, dispassionately, more guttural and perfunctory sounding than -uck or -it, and so we cannot ignore the purely linguistic implications of spelling either!
Deistic swearing is a far more challenging topic. Any notion of God must, by my logic, become part of language later than any vocabularly to do with bodily functions (it seems odd to suppose a child, for example, would discuss Hume with you before it told you thatit needed to go to the toilet). I have no doubt that the word God and notions thereof can inspire physical feelings within people that are of a potency. But I doubt that the visceral swearing explanation fits our purpose. It seems to me that a cultural explanation is more likely. Early societies which grappled with God were invariably polytheistic, prone to Shamanism. I would surmise that it is this that provides our first insight into how we came to 'blaspheme' on stubbing our toes. There were undoubtedly certain words that simply could not be uttered within these cultures save by those ordained by communities with the right to utter them. Words acquiring a taboo status undoubtedly develop a power and a mystique that others simply do not. It may well be that the fear involved in speaking such words may lead to a 'visceral swearing' type response, but this seemingly must have followed from the cultural constraints applied.
Obviously, this is a fairly redcutionist view, and it is likely that there are a plethora of other factors I've neglected. It is at least pleasing to note, however, that even stubbing one's toe can be interesting - and if you disgaree? Well, fuck off :)
Genesis
In the beginning was the word, and the word was blog.
A suitably rubbish start to what will be a hopefully interminable ramble comprising whatever thoughts grab my attention day on day...
A suitably rubbish start to what will be a hopefully interminable ramble comprising whatever thoughts grab my attention day on day...
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